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This symposium is dedicated to John Harrington’s recent monograph Towards a Rhetoric of 
Medical Law.1 The book examines the development of British health care law since the 
foundation of the National Health Service in 1948 from a critical cultural and historical 
perspective. Its ambition is two-fold. First, it seeks to explain changes in key medical law 
doctrines, for example informed consent and clinical negligence, with reference to shifts in 
the organization of health care in the UK, and with reference to the broader pattern of crisis 
and reform in British political economy over the period. It pays particular attention to the 
decline of welfarist paternalism and the rise of neo-liberal marketization in health. Second, it 
renews and extends rhetorical analysis of law, developed by modern scholars such as James 
Boyd White and Peter Goodrich. It draws on theories of legal indeterminacy, especially critical 
legal studies and systems theory, to justify the rhetorical stance. Combining classical patterns 
of analysis with tools from materialist cultural studies it shows that rhetorical criticism offers 
a powerful combination of humanistic and socio-legal approaches to law. The present 
symposium brings together a diverse group of scholars whose interests enable them to speak 
to the several ambitions of Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law and to evaluate the extent and 
limits of its achievement. These interests include rhetoric and British politics (Alan Finlayson), 
social studies of medicine and law (Emilie Cloatre), legal rhetoric (Gary Watt) and law and 
literature (Martin Kayman).2 Their contributions are followed by a reply from Harrington, part 
justification, part concession, which concludes with a brief defence of rhetoric against both 
technocratic and populist anti-rhetorics which dominate the contemporary scene in Britain 
and beyond. 
 
 
 
 
Law and the National Health Service as Metaphor 
 
Alan Finlayson 
 
On June 14th 2016 – ten days before the UK voted narrowly in favour of leaving the European 
Union – the leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, gave a speech at the Trade Union 
Congress in London. His focus was The National Health Service which he described as 
‘Labour’s proudest creation’, ‘a force for civilization’ and ‘one of our greatest achievements, 
not just as a Labour Party, but as a country’. But, he said, it was facing a crisis which Brexit 
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would make worse: ‘A vote to Leave is a vote to put our NHS in jeopardy, in the hands of those 
who want to break it up, to end it as a service free at the point of use’.3 
  
The Brexit referendum put into question how the UK imagines itself - its place in the world 
and how it should treat the peoples who are here. In answering that question Corbyn made 
the NHS into an exemplar of the nation’s historical achievements, and of a way of caring for 
each other. In so doing he was reaffirming established usage. Fifty-eight years earlier, on 
February 9th, 1949, Aneurin Bevan spoke in the House of Commons to counter the hostility 
of some in the medical profession towards the new Service. They should be proud, he argued, 
that even in straitened circumstances the country was doing ‘the most civilized thing in the 
world’ by putting ‘the welfare of the sick in front of every other consideration.’4  
 
For Bevan, famously: ‘no society can legitimately call itself civilized if a sick person is denied 
medical aid because of lack of means’.5 And after its founding the Service would become an 
index of that achievement, a way of measuring continued civilizational advance or decline and 
of contesting what we think that is. It was perhaps natural that at the opening ceremony of 
the 2012 London Olympic Games, the NHS, was portrayed as a definitive component of the 
national culture alongside Shakespeare, industrialization, and James Bond. 
  
In short, the NHS has always stood for more than itself. It is a means of providing healthcare, 
and as such to be judged by its effectiveness, alacrity or efficiency. But it is also a national 
service symbolizing and serving that community and demonstrating its ethical development. 
Its condition is always a cipher for the health of the nation – the politics of bodies and the 
body politic inextricably linked – and assessments of its capacity to care are also judgements 
of the moral fitness of the nation, propositions about who is deserving of care, and to what 
degree. The NHS, John Harrington shows, is one place where core political conflicts have been 
fought ought: rights versus responsibilities, patient autonomy versus professional authority, 
freedom from want versus freedom of choice.   
  
In this book, what John Harrington gives us is a kind of rhetorical history of this conflict – of 
the legal and political arguments surrounding it. He thus makes an important and illuminating 
contribution not only to the study of law and medicine but also to the study of British political 
culture and rhetoric. There is a growing body of work concerned with the formation, 
performance and fate of public argumentation in the UK. That work is not only a reflection of 
the influence of a range of theories and methods emphasizing the importance of varied 
practices of ‘discourse’. It is also a response to profound upheaval in the conditions of public 
communication. The nation that Bevan spoke of and spoke to could – just about – be imagined 
as sharing a common fate and as having a relatively stable if not wholly unified national 
common-sense. That idea of unity is today under pressure from, on the one hand, resurgent 
nationalisms and a range of collective interest or identity groups and, on the other hand, 
powerful forces of individualization which reduce political discourse to self-expression or 
personal branding. Transformations of the means and platforms of public communication 
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have changed who has access to, and who has power over, collective debate as well as altering 
the form of that debate (from op-ed pages and letters to the editor to Facebook threads, viral 
videos and two-hundred and eighty-character pronouncements). All of this has complicated 
and weakened traditional means for the communicative coordination of societal action, the 
creation of common understandings and reference points, giving rise to new kinds of 
democratic demand and new kinds of authoritarianism. 
  
For a Politics specialist Harrington’s book is especially interesting in this context. He shows 
how the particular codes of formalized discursive practice (legal debate and decision-making) 
are connected to wider ideological and institutional, cultural and political practice. He is 
enabled in this by a significant conceptual move made early on in the book. Affirming the 
rhetorical and intellectual creativity and effectiveness of individual judges Harrington 
immediately puts it into socio-cultural context. Judges share a conception of the law and 
resources for argumentation in the form of precedent and interpretation. They also share 
general sources ‘ranging from classical myths, religious stories and philosophical treatises, to 
novels, dramas and poetry, and political declarations and tracts’ which connect them with 
horizons of national imagining (6). Lord Denning’s judgements, Harrington writes, were 
‘intertextual in just this way, articulating a pastoral vision which resonated with long 
established literary views of England as a garden’ (7). 
  
To be clear, here, rhetoric is not simply manipulative or vapid argument, nor is it reducible to 
a list of literary tropes. Rhetoric is argument as action. It is not the only thing that argument 
is and it is not the only kind of action. But there are places and moments where action takes 
place primarily as and through discourse and where arguments can have a decisive effect on 
the outcomes of a situation. Parliament and the court room are paradigmatic examples of 
such spaces. In both, discourse plays a key role because the matters they decide upon are 
formally deemed uncertain – they constitute a controversy to be resolved. That decision 
cannot be made simply by the declaration of an authority or the application of a formula but 
must be made by an audience (jury members, judges, MPs) judging the rival arguments put 
before it. The situation demands that people act rhetorically - working out what to say about 
a particular case to a particular audience at a particular time in order to persuade them to 
think something. But such work is not conducted in an entirely open and free space. It is a 
material space in the most straightforward way: a building or a room with a layout that shapes 
the situation and which is linked with rules about who can go where, who can and can’t speak, 
where and when, and which induce certain kinds of discourse while determining in advance 
that other kinds will be ‘out of order’. Behind those formal rules are the informal ones of 
convention, custom and practice which condition what audiences will hear as legitimate 
speech or argument, the voices they will recognize as speaking in the correct way and as 
worth listening to. All of that is located within a larger social order of roles and powers, and 
articulated with other domains of public communication. 
  
All of this means that, to get a hearing, to stand a chance of being persuasive, our arguments 
need to conform to what audiences already think, know and understand. But as we have seen 
with healthcare that is neither fixed nor uniform. There is controversy because what we 
already think is not sufficient for grasping new circumstances, or because different interests 
or groups think differently and there must be some brokering, or translation, between them. 
Common sense, as Gramsci famously observed is ‘a chaotic aggregate of disparate 
conceptions’6. 
  
Rhetoric, then, ‘panders’, as Socrates complained, to what is already accepted within a 
communicative community. But because that is never uniform there is always a chance for 
rhetoric to redefine our concepts, to join ideas and images in new ways, rearticulating the 
relationship of our general values to particular cases, altering the common sense of that 
community.  As Harrington writes “common sense is both a means of rhetorical struggle and 
a stake”. 
  
Of particular value, then, is Harrington’s identification of the topoi, the “commonplaces” that 
shape our arguments about the medicine and about the National Health Service. In classical 
rhetoric there are all sorts of common topics: the definitions of things, their belonging to a 
species or genus, relations of cause and effect, precedent and probability and so on. 
Harrington, however, identifies topics particular to healthcare and medical law: paradox, 
national space, time, utopia, progress, art and ethics. These give shape to controversies, 
structuring rival conceptions of what is at stake and connect the domain of medical law to 
more general ideology and culture.  
 
For example, in the chapter on utopias Harrington explores how people like Bevan (98) and 
Richard Titmuss (99) conceived of the NHS as a place of decommodification, governed by the 
gift relationship rather than the cash nexus, and enhancing the human capacity for human 
collaboration, creativity and care. This utopian form of argument gave shape to a controversy, 
calling forth opposing arguments within the same topos: critiques of the NHS as unrealistic, 
‘merely’ utopian, and more powerfully, the charge that it is a dystopia, in need of reform. 
Healthcare could then be conceived of as a site for testing and developing a very different 
utopia. Through a reading of Ian Kennedy’s Reith Lectures, Harrington shows how the medical 
lawyer redefined medical commitment to professional care as a kind of unchecked authority 
over patients (104). In Renaissance rhetoric this is the technique of paradiastole, re-describing 
something so as to alter its location in a moral schema. For Kennedy, the necessary conclusion 
is that the Law must step in to regulate fairly the doctor-patient relationship. This became 
part of a wider rhetorical reconfiguration in which the gift economy is displaced and 
substituted by a market imagined as a utopian space of free and rational contractual 
bargaining (111). 
  
Harrington’s analysis helps us to see not only how political rhetorics enter into legal processes 
but also how legal rhetorics are picked up and employed in other domains. The political and 
legal history of the NHS is part of a history of the societal organization of imagination and 
knowledge: their interaction, and the ways some ways of thinking are constituted as 
legitimate or necessary and how that is contested through rhetorical communication. There 
is little that could be more timely. At the core of current political conflict is the collapse of the 
authority of all sorts of professional and expert discourses and the breakdown of their 
connection to the executive power, to means of public communication and to publics. 
Specialist or technical discourses have been re-described as ‘elite’, and thus as intrinsically 
illegitimate and illiberal.  
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We might say - with only a little license - that political dispute over the NHS has always been 
a Bolam Test for the state: of its professional duty, of the standards a people can expect of a 
state, and therefor of whose judgement of these things will count. But the Bolam Test 
becomes unintelligible if appeal to a body of specialist opinion is always seen as an appeal to 
one’s elite colleagues over and above the head of ‘the people’. It is tempting, in this context, 
simply to assert more forcefully the power of expert insight. But what Harrington shows is 
that this situation is part of a larger political project in which the power of judgement has 
been removed from rhetorical spaces and handed over to markets governed by the logic of 
commodities and the evaluation of the price mechanism. What Harrington helps us to see is 
the role that medical law, politics and rhetoric have played in getting us here - the better to 
see how politics, law and rhetoric may create ways for us to go somewhere else.   
  
Critique and the politics of medical law 
Emilie Cloatre 
Towards a Rhetoric of Law is an ambitious and highly original project in the field of medical 
law. Its distinct contributions are both to open-up medical law to a new form of scrutiny, and 
to re-imagine the relationship between legal doctrine, medical ethics and politics. In doing so, 
the book contributes to a much needed and arguably too rare endeavor: to revisit medical 
law not only as a technical field, but as a socially inscribed and political phenomenon. As the 
opening line of the book ambitiously states: ‘This is a critical study which seeks to “resurface 
the politics and history presently submerged in the enterprise” of medical law’7 (1). The book 
rests on the assumption that the positioning of medical ethics as the central source of 
normative power in medical law has resulted in the field losing sight of other constitutive 
elements. For example, ‘it suggests that the standard model of scholarship rests on an 
oversimplified understanding of the nature of legal argumentation which neglects the 
pervasive phenomenon of indeterminacy in lawyers’ reasoning’ (2). 
The proposal, carefully delivered in the book, is to use rhetorics as a lens to draw out this 
indeterminacy and the ultimate constitution of possibilities and plausibilities through medical 
law. This enables the analysis ‘to study speech from the perspective of politics and power’ (4), 
thereby reallocating to medical law its historical and political context. While informed by an 
impressive range of theoretical concepts, Harrington’s argument throughout is heavily 
influenced most visibly by two sets of thoughts. First, it is shaped by a materialist Marxist 
approach, and an attention to how shifts in economic structures have co-constituted medical 
law from the post-war period. The effects of capitalism (understood through an ecological 
model, as socially-embedded) on legal understandings of the NHS and on the practice of 
medicine are important focal points of the analysis (9). This also shapes Harrington’s 
understanding of both law and medicine, including ‘a particular concern with medicine and 
law as forms of work’ (9). Second, Systems Theory is influential in shaping Harrington’s 
understanding of law’s indeterminacy, and of its relationships with other fields, notably 
medical ethics. 
Harrington’s analysis is compelling, and his case for the broader significance of medical law is 
significant: too often, medical law has failed to engage broader readership, or to be mobilized 
in conceptual critiques. Reasserting its political and historical dimensions is a crucial reminder 
of why thinking critically about medicine and law is a fruitful exercise to enrich critical 
understandings of law as social phenomenon. The emphasis on reading the law as discourse 
enables him to demonstrate how shifts, tensions and disagreements in law also reflect the 
stakes and framings of particular times. For example, as the NHS of the Beveridge report has 
progressively been attacked and transformed, and shifted away from its utopian origins, 
medical law has come to redefine what citizens could expect from the state and what 
constitutes acceptable welfare.  
 
Harrington’s analysis is deployed throughout the book through a careful and expansive 
exploration of medical law cases and documents that illustrate key historical shifts and 
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moments. The book’s structure is organized around what he refers to as ‘topics’, i.e. ‘positions 
or common-sense assumptions shared between speaker and audience, from which an 
argument can begin’ (12). Those reflect crucial moments and tendencies in the national 
history and politics of medicine that the book explores: ‘national space; time and the 
organization of treatment; the NHS as a utopian project; the idea of medicine as an art and 
as a progressive science’ (13). But they also echo, and are ultimately framed as, important 
themes in contemporary critical legal scholarship (Space; Time; Utopia; Progress; Art; Ethics). 
This illustrates Harrington’s effort to address broad conceptual questions through a 
discussion deeply grounded in the particularities of medicine. This is successfully delivered 
throughout:  the book is an exceptional crafting of post-war medical law as a field of inquiry, 
and while also making a compelling argument for understanding medical law as a political 
field.  
The book’s argument is made through a highly thorough and meticulous engagement with 
key cases and moments in medical law (in England and Wales). This is important in illustrating 
the approach itself – the close attention to legal documents and case-law is warranted by the 
discursive emphasis. But this means that material covered in the book also constitutes in and 
of itself a crucial resource in medical law readings. The breadth of the thematics covered cuts 
across the field of medical law, and enables the reader to grasp its vast socio-political 
ramifications on issues such as gender, immigration, welfare, or individual rights. This is a 
particularly worthy aspect of the book because, in medical law, as elsewhere, there has been 
a tendency for such topic specialization that cross-cutting conversations have not always been 
enabled. In this the book constitutes a useful reminder of why such engagement across issues 
are important to provide new conceptualizations. Furthermore, by paying attention to shifts 
and dissents on essential topics of medical law since the post-war, Harrington is also able to 
demonstrate the continued significance of long-rooted debates, and indeed the ways in which 
law has embedded political shifts and transformations.  As healthcare continues to be at the 
core of political tensions, and as the NHS is both approaching its 70th anniversary, and facing 
one of its most significant crisis, the historical perspective the book provides on the 
transformation  of the ‘taken-for-granted’ over time is particularly striking: historical framings 
echo contemporary struggles over the role of the state in healthcare provision, over what 
may be considered as acceptable levels and forms of care, over competing rights or the 
influence of borders in shaping access to health. As well as its impressive analysis of legal 
documents and cases, the book provides a similarly remarkable overview of scholarly debates 
in the field, and a careful reflection on how its particular methodological approach can 
productively engage other currents of thoughts and concepts. In those respects, while it 
provides a challenging and erudite read, the book is also a thorough and dynamic overview 
of the field for non-specialist readers, and for those looking to explore how medical law can 
feed into broader critiques. The structuring of this thorough analysis around conceptual 
themes, or ‘topics’, is an effective way to draw out the lived politics of medical law. It also 
enables Harrington to carefully ground each of these topics of medical law into broader 
scholarship on core concepts such as time or space, while enabling the discursive analysis to 
draw out the social construction of these elements through medical law. Again, this 
contribution is particularly important for medical law as a field that still needs critical opening, 
but is also rarely engaged by more general critical reflections on law. The political dimension 
of medicine, historically and in contemporary settings, should however enable such 
mobilization and engagement, as Harrington illustrates here. In that, the book is also a gesture 
for other scholars to continue to build and expand on the core ideas that the analysis is 
suggesting.  
 
Harrington’s book is a fantastic effort to critically mobilize a field that has rarely received 
cross-cutting and conceptual attention. As such stimulating books tend to do, it also opens-
up a number of new questions and avenues for future explorations. Here I will sketch out two 
such sets of questions. First, in its challenge to a rational and apolitical vision of medical law, 
Harrington’s book echoes efforts deployed in recent years by interdisciplinary scholars to 
rethink the relationship between law and medicine, and to reimagine how law and medicine 
participate in shaping the social, as process and practice. Some of these conversations have 
emerged from Science and Technology Studies (STS), and broader reflections on the relations 
between law and science (or the ‘social studies of law’8). Often conceptually influenced by 
STS, and to some extent anthropology, this scholarship has shared Harrington’s interest in 
disrupting the taken-for-granted of medical law, and the self-construction of law and 
medicine as value-free and rational systems of thought. Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law 
adds to this critical engagement. However, where others have focused on deconstructing 
scientific discourses and knowledges in their interactions with law, or on socio-legal practices 
or objects as sites of entanglement, his focus on the rhetoric of law takes the critique in a 
different direction. A distinctive outcome of STS-inflected approaches to law and medicine 
has been to pay renewed attention to the role of materials in legal processes, and to the 
displacement of law through embedded practices. In turn, this has suggested a closer scrutiny 
of law as lived practice, outside of the courts and of strictly legal spaces. Such focus has 
enabled an expansion of what is considered as the boundaries of law (and of medicine) as 
social spheres, and to reimagining the ways in which the boundaries of, for example, medical 
knowledge that contributes to legal making get constituted. This emphasis on materiality (in 
the STS sense of the term) provides a contrasting standpoint from the discursive analysis 
Harrington provides, that nonetheless could be brought into fruitful conversation. This is 
particularly so because materiality-inflected theories have been influential in drawing out the 
fluidity of the social, and of some of its key elements that the book also explores. Themes 
such as time9 or space10 have been progressively revisited through this emphasis on the 
fluidity of the social, resulting, for example, on understandings of progress and modernity 
that echo the disruptive readings suggested by Harrington. At the same time, the emphasis 
on the fluidity of the social on which such approaches rest do not sit easily with what at times 
appears as a more causal reading of historical events that the book suggests, or indeed with 
the more structural approach it suggests to understandings of trends and events. Second, 
some of the critical questions that explorations of medicine as a set of social practice have 
raised are not fully explored in the book itself. Again, this is not a limitation of the book, nor 
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is it necessary for its argument to most convincingly unfold, but it leaves some scope to 
productively engage its key themes into new directions, and bring medical law in further 
conversations with medical humanities. Medicine as both profession and knowledge-system 
is itself relatively discreet – though never simplified nor taken for granted – in the analysis of 
medical law provided. Medical law as a discourse, and the discourses of medical law, however 
are inevitably entangled in the different shifts and existences that medicine as institution and 
practice has occupied over the years. Critical explorations of medical law can in turn provide 
some significant if underexplored elements to understand the political resonance of medicine 
as an apparatus of governance and power. Similarly, bringing together critical understandings 
of medicine with a careful excavation of medical law knowledge are essential to a better 
understanding of how legal moments are built into medicine itself. Engaging with the 
‘medical’ of medical law in such a way would inevitably require a shift towards sites that are 
not legal per se. This would enable a different form of engagement with the politics of medical 
law, the type of power it hides and often renders more discreet, and in turn the possibilities 
for resistance and challenges.  
To sum up, Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law is an outstanding book and a much-needed 
contribution to the field. It is thorough, innovative, and ambitious; it is also a generous book 
that provides a basis for much future engagement, exchanges and conversation. As the crisis 
of care continues to impact lives and bodies across spaces and jurisdictions, rendering the 
politics of law in medicine visible seems to acquire new urgency. Towards a Rhetoric of 
Medical Law is an important publication that makes a strong argument for a such new political 
enterprise, and a compelling case for the relevance of rhetoric to understanding the practice 
of law, and of how lived-politics become constructed in and through law.  
  
Touching the Matter of Medical Law 
Gary Watt 
 
Since the Enlightenment and the rise of the empirical scientific paradigm, legal practice and 
the legal academy in the United Kingdom, as in other common law jurisdictions, has tended 
to downplay and denigrate the role of rhetoric in constituting legal ideas and producing 
practical outcomes in legal cases. There has, however, been a more recent and increasing 
appreciation of rhetoric’s positive potential and with it a reassertion of our need to approach 
legal materials with a critical awareness of rhetorical methods. The modern move to regard 
rhetoric as the principal constitutive art of legal speech and legal acts can be traced back to 
James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination first published in 1973. The re-publication in 2018 
of that large and lively handbook in legal rhetorical method follows a number of recent 
publications that have sought to impress the value and importance of rhetoric upon a largely 
cynical legal community. We have, for example, the Australian publication Rediscovering 
Rhetoric: Law, Language, and the Practice of Persuasion;11 the US publications, Our Word is 
Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts12 and Living in a Law Transformed: Encounters with the 
works of James Boyd White13 and in the UK, The Art of Persuasion: Tradition and Technique 
by Adrian Whitfield QC, a retired judge of the High Court.14 John Harrington’s Towards a 
Rhetoric of Medical Law joins this movement and steers it in some significant new directions, 
not least of which is to apply rhetorical methods to a specific legal and political context – is 
there any context more important? – that of medical law, and in particular the UK’s National 
Health Service. 
A distinctive achievement of Harrington’s approach, and it is a book full of achievements, is 
that he has given shape to the idea of the NHS as something tangible; something of material 
substance that is formed by a shared creative vision and by the creative practical work of 
many hands. This insight into the NHS, and NHS discourse, as a social and cultural artefact 
produced through rhetorical arts is an insight that will transfer well to other contexts, not 
least of which is legal practice. At almost the centre point of his book, in the chapter that 
charts and surveys the NHS as ‘Utopia’, we find one of the most intriguing and surprising sub-
headings of the entire work: ‘Labour as art: William Morris’. As it lies at the heart of the book, 
so it seems to me to lie at the heart of Harrington’s rhetorical appreciation. The essence of 
the beautiful argument of that section is that the founding ethos of the NHS was something 
akin to that of the Arts and Crafts movement. Harrington writes that for William Morris, best 
known now for his commitment to craftwork over mass production, ‘labour freed from “the 
brutalities of competitive commerce” is equated with art’ (102).15 He follows this quote with 
the fascinating and perceptive suggestion that within the early NHS ‘the medical profession’s 
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view of itself partook of this wider ideal of free labour. As such it chimed with Bevan’s [it’s 
founder’s] aspiration for workers more generally’. In this ideal view, experts work together 
with pride and dignity to craft something of artistic beauty because they are personally and 
deeply committed to the project. The Utopian vision is as simple as it is sweet – labours of 
love will make something of more lasting and humane worth than could ever be achieved by 
fully-costed arms-length, free-market exchange. Disjunction between the Utopia and the 
practical reality has played out as a long-running political drama ever since the founding of 
the NHS, but the rhetorical point is that the ideal vision has substantial appeal that in practice 
persuades participants in the system to give it the best chance of ongoing life.  
Harrington’s material turn is signalled early on, where he writes that ‘a rhetorical approach 
returns us to the concrete context of any given judicial, parliamentary or academic speech…as 
such it counters the tendency in law and ethics towards abstraction’ (2). It continues 
throughout the book and is especially emphasised in the penultimate chapter “Art” where 
Harrington associates the concrete, material concern of legal rhetoric with the common law’s 
prioritisation of ‘the case’ (150). He describes ‘precedent cases establishing various rules’ as 
‘the very material of the common law’ (151-2). How frequently we overlook the materiality 
of legal language by which tangible ideas are held in our minds and given sympathetically, 
that is rhetorically, ‘touching’ form. Yet it is present in such commonplace cant as the 
suggestion that a common law judge ‘finds’ X as a matter of fact and ‘holds’ Y as a matter of 
law and then ‘hands down’ judgment. The metaphor of judicial craft as a material moulding 
and making could hardly be clearer.16 The Latin prefix to so many cases in medical law ‘In re’ 
(‘in the matter of’) ought to give the game away. 
All jurists should chorus Harrington’s lament that ‘Rhetoric is no longer the substance of 
law…but is rather viewed as the other of scientific legal studies…an embarrassing hangover’ 
(3). He is quite correct in this complaint. I recently surveyed academic articles on Westlaw UK 
and found that almost one third of those with the word ‘rhetoric’ in their title also contained 
the word ‘reality’ in their title.17 This was not to stress the deep and important connection 
between the two ideas, but rather to stress their disjunction. The unreality of rhetoric was 
always implied – and usually expressed – as in the phrases ‘rhetoric or reality?’ and ‘from 
rhetoric to reality’. Legal commentators’ collective failure to imagine a more diverse range of 
titles for their articles betrays a deeper and more serious failure to imagine that rhetoric might 
actually constitute the reality of what law does and how law is perceived socially. Harrington 
approves Gerald B Wetlaufer, who observed in his article ‘Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal 
Discourse’ that ‘any bid to claim, the mantle of “reason” by condemning an opposite view as 
“mere rhetoric” is itself a thoroughly strategic, or rhetorical move’.18 I wonder, though, if 
Harrington slips into a similar move (a sort of ‘mere rhetoric’ dismissal), where he writes that 
‘Rhetorical analysis promises considerably more than the identification of apt techniques for 
moving audiences…it also allows us to study speech from the perspectives of politics and 
power’ (4) (my emphasis added). This is a false contrast, surely. A deep appreciation of 
‘techniques for moving audiences’ can hardly fail to have implications for politics and power, 
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it is for this reason that appreciation of the dramatic rhetoric of William Shakespeare 
continues to urge us so forcefully in the critical appreciation of political events. Harrington 
could occasionally be bolder in his commitment to material metaphors for law’s rhetorical 
substance. Rhetorical appreciation of the constitutive role of metaphor in legal language 
tends to prioritise what Harrington calls ‘metaphorics of visibility’ (31), but his list of examples 
– ‘submerge’, ‘sublimate’, ‘suppress’, ‘mask’, ‘eclipse’ – includes several that can be equally, 
and perhaps more fully, appreciated within a ‘metaphoric of materiality’. These points of 
nuance should not detract from the potential importance of Harrington’s material turn in 
medical law. As Harrington indicates in his approval of Grear (31-32), attention to the 
affective, touching reality of medical rhetoric offers an improvement upon the excessive 
simplicity of ‘rights-talk’ and its tendency to reduce issues, for example in the abortion 
debate, ‘to a binary contest of abstract principles’. Harrington’s rhetorical critique of 
reductive language, especially the traditional binary and rights-based language of legal 
conflict, lands a palpable hit precisely because it prefers a language of palpability. It is a 
critique with implications for rhetorical practices across a wide range of medical law contexts. 
For example, a judge who reads this book might hopefully avoid reductive errors of the sort 
committed by Ward LJ in Re A (Separation of Conjoined Twins), where he described conjoined 
baby twins as individuals competing against each other to impose mutually inconsistent 
rights: ‘In this unique case it is, in my judgment, impossible not to put in the scales of each 
child the manner in which they are individually able to exercise their right to life’.19 
In the chapter entitled ‘Space’, Harrington quotes Ward LJ in Re A who had stated in his 
judgment that the visiting Maltese family were not ‘Kosovan refugees unjustifiably draining 
our resources’ (54). Harrington alerts us to the territorial and possessive ‘our’ in such 
statements. Harrington’s engagement with the spatial dimension of the constitutive rhetoric 
of medical law might be extended to the ‘hospital’. In Re A, the hospital that invited the 
Maltese family to receive the benefit of their expertise turned hospitality to hostage-taking 
when the conjoined twins were locked into the medico-legal machine and surgically 
separated against the expressed wishes of the parents. The hospital is a space that is intensely 
imbued with rhetorical meaning. It is shorthand for help, expertise and resources, but along 
the way we have largely forgotten the original sense of ‘hospitality’. The ancient Greeks who 
were the first to cultivate a sense of rhetorical space or topos prized hospitality as the 
preeminent ethical value associated with space. Indeed, for a host to treat a guest 
inhospitably was the sort of offence against divine and natural law that called for the revenge 
of the Furies.  
In Chapter 4, Harrington makes the elegant move from space to ‘Time’. He doesn’t suggest, 
any more than an ancient Greek dramatist (or indeed a modern physicist) would suggest, that 
space and time are completely distinct categories. Indeed, early in the book (31) he gave the 
example of ‘legislative intention’, as a notion that blends rhetorical space (topos) with a sense 
of time in so far as it ‘functions as a topic of legal discourse absorbing the contingency of the 
law-making process by representing it as a single moment when Parliament speaks 
unambiguously and with one voice’.20 In ‘Time’, Harrington identifies the risk that hasty 
decision-making might endanger justice. He opines that ‘where law comes under pressure to 
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accelerate its procedures, there is a risk that pathos will eclipse logos in legal deliberation and 
that emotions such as anger or pity will prevail over reasoned deliberation’ (73). He’s right 
about anger (ira furor brevis est, and all that), except perhaps when it comes to anger of the 
righteous sort that overturns tables in temples, but I’m not sure he’s right about pity. Pity 
might not conform to the cold calculus of strict logic, but isn’t pity a good reason? For early 
modern judge and rhetorician Thomas Wilson, author of The Arte of Rhetorique, the art of 
rhetoric is by definition the art of ‘movyng pitie, and stirring men to mercie’.21 
Harrington’s greatest achievement in this book is a rhetorical one. He has translated his own 
intellectual grasp of medical law into a humane feel for medical law. To express it in terms of 
the classic qualities of rhetorical art as Aristotle described them, he impresses us with an ethos 
(ethic) and a pathos (sympathy) that makes his logos (logic) humanly persuasive. To per-suade 
means to influence ‘through sweetness’. Harrington’s impressive book gives us a spoonful of 
sugar to help some strong medicine go down.  
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Around the Rhetoric of Rhetoric 
Martin Kayman 
 
A book that proposes (‘Towards’) a rhetoric for a body of law cannot but appeal to someone 
in law-and-literature who comes from the hind legs of that pantomime horse, the literary. 
And when the book begins with a chapter entitled ‘Rhetoric’ and concludes with a critical 
account of ‘Ethics’, it feels like the revenge of the linguistic or textual turn of the 1970s against 
the ethical turn of the 1990s and 2000s. The humanities-led understanding that culture 
should be regarded as a text was a warrant for literary critics and theorists to treat the law 
‘as literature’. For many that meant regarding law in much the same way as they were in fact 
treating their own subject: not as the expression of universal moral values but as historically 
and politically embedded and compromised with power.22 Contrarily, the subsequent turn to 
ethics warned against what it represented as the dangers of an over-theorised, excessively 
text-focused and, as a result, anti-humanist view of experience, and of its tendency merely to 
celebrate the indeterminacy of meaning while condemning the injustices of historic, state, 
and late capitalism. As many critical lawyers likewise observed, a simple focus on the textual 
was of questionable value in addressing the actual suffering undergone by individuals at the 
hands of the law.23 Literary critics and theorists were thus called upon to reencounter the 
ethical dimension that they had, it appears, repressed in their zeal to liberate literary studies 
from the sort of high moral purpose that had informed its traditional ideological functions, 
and to re-form a positive alliance with moral philosophy.24  
Nothing as simplistic in John Harrington’s book, of course, as a return to the sort of 
hermeneutical wrangling that had characterised the early stages of American law-and-
literature criticism.25 Starting from the constitutive indeterminacy of legal decision-making as 
a given, Harrington adopts an approach to rhetoric in the service of a ‘cultural sociology’.26 Its 
purpose is to surface the political history that explains how medical law developed in the UK 
in the context of the shift from the Keynesian post-war welfare settlement to the global, neo-
liberal regime. At the same time, Harrington’s rhetorically forceful and tightly-crafted text 
serves as a sort of methodological manifesto not only for the analysis of the political and 
economic forces at work in the law but also for an explanation of the ways in which the 
resulting doctrine has been effectively constructed in language: treating a body of law as a 
rhetoric explains how it generates plausible forms of common sense and hence triumphs in 
concrete historical circumstances. 
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 Rhetoric has in fact been a favoured ‘literary’ resource for American reformist, literature-
inspired legal scholars such as James Boyd White and for British critical legal scholars like 
Peter Goodrich precisely as a pathway to re-encounter an ethos of justice ‘before the law’.27 
Indeed, Boyd White’s theorisation of law as a rhetoric that creates forms of community, and 
his optimistic programme to ameliorate the ethos of the law through training in rhetoric, the 
methods of literary criticism, and the sensitive reading of selected works of literature, can be 
regarded as foundational to the liberal version of law-and-literature.28 On the other hand, 
Peter Goodrich has recovered the classical traditions of Renaissance rhetoric that were 
contemporary with the early development of a self-conscious national Common Law tradition 
as a critical means of analysing the latter’s unconscious.29 In both instances, as here, rhetorical 
analysis gives the legal scholar a privileged position in a pre-modern literary tradition from 
which to critique modern, or postmodern, law. 
In Harrington’s case, rhetorical analysis is linked to cultural sociology through systems theory. 
Drawing on Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner, Harrington argues that the ‘paradoxes and 
perplexities’, confronting decisions in modern law are ‘“managed” (or “deparadoxified”) by 
being displaced onto “black boxes” outside the legal system’ – in the exemplary case of 
medical law, to medical practice or academic bioethics.30 These acts of displacement 
construct silent hierarchies, such that ethics has now become ‘the master discipline for 
medical law’, ‘the truth of the law in this area’.31 Is, in effect, something of a similar order 
possibly happening here in methodological terms – as reflected in the glee expressed in my 
first paragraph? Arguably, methodological disputes within legal scholarship are as 
unresolvable within their own terms as any legal decision and require their own ‘black boxes’ 
to be managed; likewise, in that most plural of subjects, literary study. Various disciplines can 
serve the law: theology, economics, empirical social science ... or, as we have seen, within the 
assortment of literary approaches, rhetoric. Finally, the fact that this is a classical rhetoric 
provides it with a similar pedigree to the ancient sources of ethical thought. Rhetoric hence 
appears as a master method not for resolving the indeterminacies of legal decision-making, 
but precisely for making them visible, via its mastery over the master discourse of bioethics. 
 
That, in all likelihood, can be viewed as a rhetorical move on my part. Nevertheless, it does 
draw attention to the book’s own rhetorics, starting with its form of address and the 
complicity it establishes with its intended audiences. One of the most plausible of the book’s 
arguments is the way in which it articulates the consonance and complementarities that have 
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existed between the self-perceptions of medical professionals and common law judges as 
practitioners in their respective fields.32 Further, Harrington intensifies the resonance of the 
argument by embedding this shared sense of authority and method in a persuasive narrative 
of representations of ‘professional work’ as ‘a form of labour’ from the nineteenth century to 
the present.33 This is where academic readers are bound to recognise themselves.  
In this narrative, crudely put (by me, never by Harrington), the post-war creation of the 
National Health Service relied on a trust in the judgement of professionals predicated on their 
protection from the market in a utopian ‘enclave’ of non-commodified human relations in 
which the courts, like the patient, deferred to their benevolent authority.34 According to 
Harrington’s account, the enclave functioned as a metonymy for an idealised national space. 
But, as he notes, citing Krishan Kumar, ‘Anti-utopia has “stalked” utopia since its 
beginnings’.35 From the 1980s, the autonomy of the medical profession has been challenged 
in the name of ‘sovereign patient-consumers’.36 This figure has become the gateway for the 
recommodification of medicine and the recasting of the relationship between professionals 
and others on a contractual basis. The enclave has become vulnerable to commercial 
considerations and governed by external reporting and regulatory frameworks that promote 
government policy in the name of ‘transparency’ and ‘value for money’. By the same token, 
the personal skill and judgement of the experienced professional have been downgraded in 
favour of ‘evidence-based’ choices made by funders and/or informed and autonomous 
patients. The new ethos is enforced by courts that, in the case of medical law, now defer to 
bioethicists rather than to the medical profession. 
Where, then, does one, as an academic working in the British system, stand in relation to this 
narrative? Certainly, the pleasure I expressed at the opening goes beyond the particular 
disciplinary interests of the literary scholar; the book’s address invites my ready complicity 
with its account of features that are easily transposed into what we have been experiencing 
in our form of professional labour. From a rhetorical point of view, as a professional in the 
Humanities, one recognises the ideal of a self-governing learned and experimental 
community protected from the demands of the market, exercising nuanced individual 
judgements on specific complex cases that respect intellectual traditions (precedent) but 
value plurality and dissent. This is far from exploded by the book’s critical tone – which one 
shares, of course – in relation to that model’s elitism, conservatism, and paternalism. At the 
same time, academic readers are likely to identify and more acutely condemn the aggressions 
of the market-oriented, state-regulated contractual regime of an increasingly commodified 
present.  
Before one feels too comfortable with this, it is worth exercising a degree of reflective 
awareness of the rhetoric involved. As Harrington points out, from the 1980s, ‘[t]he legitimacy 
of professional self-regulation was in part undermined by a series of scandals involving 
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criminal behaviour and extreme malpractice’.37 Yet, while the rise of ‘rights-based critiques 
of welfare provision and the social and economic subordination of women’ and the role of 
radical lawyers and sociologists in the critique of the traditional professional model are 
recognised, these are swiftly absorbed into the exploitation of these arguments by the 
ascendant ideology of the Hayekian libertarian right.38 In other words, the text effectively 
marginalises critiques of what it describes as the characteristically ‘English’ idiom of the utopic 
vision other than that spoken in the anti-rhetorical, globalised ‘Anglo-American’ lingua franca 
English of neo-liberalism.39  
This, I suggest, is in part a consequence of the rhetorical focus of the approach. From a 
rhetorical point of view, alternative justifications for increased protection for the subjects of 
professional interventions are obliged to yield to the central perspective of the analysis, which 
relates fundamentally to the plausibility of professionals in medicine and law in their 
addresses to each other, and the plausibility, in this case to the academic reader, of the neo-
liberal versus Keynesian narrative as an overall explanatory frame. Consequently, 
Harrington’s analysis is purposively ‘logocentric’ in the specific sense that it explicitly 
privileges logos (‘the truth, consistency and plausibility of the argument itself’) over the other 
two major Aristotelian categories of persuasion, pathos and ethos – and, within logos, ‘the 
topic or commonplace’.40 In observing that ‘Pathos is not common in judicial rhetoric’ but can 
be a feature of medical law cases, Harrington refers here to the ‘visible presence of patient 
litigants’, furnishing ‘the necessary element of immediacy between them and the audience’, 
calling forth ‘public emotions’ which are amplified by ‘media representations’ and 
‘publicity’.41 Judges, Harrington continues, then ‘often develop compensatory rhetorical 
strategies to contain the pathos aroused by the facts of the case in hand’. So too, perhaps, 
the book’s rhetorical strategy – i.e. its use of rhetorical analysis as a strategy – also inevitably 
‘contains’ the ‘visible’, ‘immediate’ and ‘emotional’ presence of the patient as a signifier 
within its analysis.  
This, then, is where I need to qualify my enthusiasm for the book’s vindication of the textual 
turn. It was precisely this sort of containment of presence, immediacy and affect that, in my 
opinion, was the most pertinent criticism to emerge from the ‘pictorial turn’ in the 1990s: not 
so much the textual turn’s alleged disregard for ethical values, but the creeping imperialism 
of the linguistic sign over all cultural experience, the tendency to ‘read’ all phenomena 
through linguistic models.42 So, as happened following the panel discussion at the book’s 
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launch in Cardiff on 6 June 2017, I find myself drawn to the historically significant and visually 
striking image that occupies the upper half of the front cover. The photograph, we learn from 
the last words on the back cover, represents ‘Aneurin Bevan, on the launch of the National 
Health Service … with Sylvia Diggory its “first patient”’.43 Diggory is a distinctly uncanny 
presence here, her lower body absorbed into the soft and almost formless expanse of white 
that extends across the bottom of the image, contrasting in its sensuousness with the parallel 
upper band of flat and featureless sky neatly framed by the grid of window panes (no pun). 
Beyond the line of the title and author, her face, already squeezed up against the left-hand 
margin by the cropping of the original photograph, forms part of the case cover’s outer hinge 
and is distorted as one opens the book.  
I draw attention to Ms Diggory in this way not in any sense to invalidate the admirable 
ambition and estimable achievement of Towards a Rhetoric of Medical Law. Besides the 
eventually gratuitous reminder of the uncanny and uncontainable bodies that underlie the 
grids formed by our professional talk and verbal and bibliographical frameworks, the turn to 
the image as it appears on the face of the book is additionally intended to point to the 
existence of other cultural contexts and discourses in which, to use Harrington’s own term, 
law is ‘embedded’,44 and supplementary critical approaches that might further explore, 
alongside this Rhetoric, how ‘common sense’ around health care – and other professional – 
practices and institutions is constructed in the broader socio-cultural realm. A gesture 
towards further interdisciplinarity, perhaps. 
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The Time and Place of Rhetoric: A Response 
John Harrington45  
Classical rhetoricians talked about kairos, the timeliness and time-boundedness of any 
speech. When was it delivered? What were the conditions of its reception? Did it speak 
successfully to the moment and place in which it was delivered? Among other things, my book 
offers a discussion of time and space in medical law scholarship and adjudication in just this 
way. But what is the kairos of the text itself? My concern with this and my thoughts on it are 
prompted by the generous and insightful responses to the book which you have just read. 
The book’s content, its theoretical ambitions, and its relation to the broader political context 
are realized, in so far as they are realized at all, across three temporal dimensions.  
The first of these is novelty: the hope of providing a new perspective on medical law and how 
it is written, what is supressed in that process, and how it might be recovered. This required 
me to set extant medical law reasoning within the larger architecture of the NHS and the post-
war welfare state, giving the book a certain structuralist orientation which Cloatre notes. 
These mundane circumstances had been evoked in preambular fashion by many textbook 
writers in medical law. But their enduring influence on the development of legal doctrine and 
scholarship itself had not, I felt, been consistently accounted for. This omission was enabled, 
at least in the early years of the discipline, by a predominant focus on the relationship 
between doctor and patient. Old-style professionals in law and medicine constructed this 
relationship in terms of fatherly care for an essentially infantilized patient, while reformers 
like Ian Kennedy sought to reshape it in the name of ethics, advancing patient autonomy or 
control over the course of treatment. In both cases, however, the individual clinical moment 
was privileged as the site of ethical significance and legal regulation. It is a central ambition 
of the book to show the cultural and political conditions under which this privileging of the 
clinical encounter was possible.  
That intention was reflected in my choice of image for the book’s front cover. Pictured in it 
are a nurse and matron from Trafford General Hospital (I have not been able to trace their 
names), along with Sylvia Diggory, claimed to be the ‘first patient’ of the new NHS, and it 
founder Aneurin Bevan, health minister and former coal miner. Light streams in through a 
large window behind them. For me both personae and composition figured the collective, 
gesturing at the structures neglected in orthodox scholarship, promising a genuine politics of 
medical law by locating it within a given historical conjuncture and a specific national context. 
Not only are doctors and judges absent from this scene, but the choice of image deliberately 
differs from that commonly proposed by publishers for medical law texts. The latter draw 
consistently on the iconography of Hippocratic or scientific medicine as mediated by 
professional judgment: stethoscopes, snakes, pills and coils of DNA variously wrapping 
themselves around the scales of justice. Martin Kayman renders me a service by reading the 
picture and its physical presentation on the front cover symptomatically and thereby picking 
out the occlusions which sustain my own rhetorical effort. Sylvia Diggory, her image pushed 
to edge of the page, stands for the marginalization of palpable suffering and its political 
expression by the book’s structure of address. Scholars, judges and doctors are first among 
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the subjects and audiences of my argument. In seeking to return medical law to history (or 
more precisely to return history to medical law) and wrench the focus away from the clinical 
encounter, I will admit to what Kayman calls a certain, necessary anti-humanism, a bias which 
is admittedly not fully articulated in the text itself. 
The second temporal mode is that of retrieval: a return to neglected methods and their 
adaption for new purposes. My concern with the politics and contexts of doctrinal debates in 
medical law, led me back to the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, a theoretical influence 
identified by Cloatre. Earlier CLS scholars set upon the core areas of legal teaching and 
scholarship - tort, criminal law, contract and so on - with deconstructive intent. But medical 
law, as a much newer area, well beyond the heart of the canon, was never confronted in the 
same way. CLS methods offered potential for reading the play of political and social influences 
within the back and forth of doctrinal debate. Their emphasis on the indeterminacy of legal 
reasoning warned against confusing the significance of structure with out-and-out 
determinism.  
The CLS practice of closely reading judicial and other texts, and the explicit promptings of 
writers in that movement, led me to attempt a further retrieval: of rhetoric, classical and 
modern. I was encouraged by pioneering law and literature scholars: James Boyd White on 
law’s communities and Peter Goodrich on the critical potential of classical analysis.  In that 
regard, I share Alan Finlayson’s understanding that rhetoric is action, capable of changing the 
world by moving audiences to decide and act. I also share Gary Watt’s frustration with the 
terminological use of rhetoric as a foil for the properly rational or scientific intervention of 
legal scholars, journalists, politicians and so forth. While I heed his further warning that 
‘techniques to move audiences’ are never to be dismissed as merely superficial, I am also 
wary of those false friends who would retail rhetoric as a toolkit for winning friends and 
influencing people. I maintain that we can still go deep with rhetoric, using it as a mode of 
critique ‘all the way down’. It opens up valuable insights into processes of political change, 
their sedimentation in social structures, and their relationship of reciprocal influence upon 
legal argumentation. Rhetoric, as Roland Barthes argued, is an eminently modern means of 
doing critical cultural sociology.46 
The nature of these critical retrievals led to the tight spatial framing of Towards a Rhetoric of 
Medical Law across various scales. At its most general, the book tells a national story, as 
Finlayson points out. I attend consistently to the British and English idioms and resonances of 
medical law discourse, all the while noting their constructed and revisable forms and the 
ambiguity of the relationship between them. At its most particular, the book privileges the 
court room as the object of study. Readings in the philosophy of science, critical epistemology 
and the history of medicine furnished critical perspectives on doctors and their work. But that 
was always in the service of understanding their representation in the texts of official medical 
law: judicial decisions, parliamentary debates and academic commentary. This twin focus 
meant that other spaces received less attention, as noted by three of the discussants in their 
comments and suggestions. Cloatre proposes ‘medicine and law’, rather than just ‘medical 
law’, as the object of a more wide-ranging study examining how both practices and discourses 
are co-constituted. The latter would proceed by way of an ethnography that takes the 
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material seriously not only within the courtroom, but also at sites well beyond the formal 
legal system. Watt picks out the hospital as a distinct site for the production of medical law 
rhetoric, with classical as well as contemporary resonances. He too urges the claims of the 
material, reminding us that the tangible and the palpable have considerable rhetorical 
effectiveness. Kayman, as noted above, suggests a still more concentrated focus on the 
suffering bodies of patients, one which demands a broadening of critical attention to include 
image as well as text. 
The third moment of the book is conjunctural: its relationship to the broader political 
circumstances within which it was written and in which it is read. These can be grasped by 
following Finlayson’s insight that the NHS has always stood for more than itself. It functions 
for the British left as the royal family and the military do for the right: a synecdoche of the 
nation itself in all its ideals and travails. The idiom is one of recurrent crisis, a catastrophist 
rhetoric that predicts the imminent end of Bevan’s vision. The efforts of politicians and their 
expert economic advisers to ‘reform’ the Service have been equally punctual and equally 
productive of the crises which they would themselves resolve. In Towards a Rhetoric of 
Medical Law I fold these episodic crises into a longer-run schema of state-run welfare, beset 
by fiscal and legitimacy deficits in the 1970s, which were themselves provisionally resolved 
by neo-liberal restructuring in the decades thereafter.  
There was no end of history of course. Neo-liberal orthodoxy is now itself challenged by a 
shrill populism. Finlayson invites us to consider the ramifications of this eruption for rhetoric 
and to relate it to the preceding phases.  In taking up that invitation I return to the three 
modes of proof in classical rhetoric, which I discuss more fully in chapter 3 of the book. These 
help us to understand that the journey to the present conjuncture has also been a rhetorical 
one, which can be traced through the varied emphasis on ethos, pathos and logos in each 
phase.  
First, welfarist paternalism. In British medicine, as I argue throughout the book, this was 
secured by the doctrinal figure of the Bolam test which privileged professional opinion in 
determining health care controversies. The rhetorical action here was oriented to ethos. It 
promoted the authority of medical professionals, embodied in their persons, manifested in 
the practice of their craft, as Watt observes, and supported by their judicial homologues, all 
inscribed within a hierarchy articulated and defended in conservative cultural terms.  
Second, a technocratic fix for problems thrown up by welfarism. This tendency includes the 
commodification of health care and the imposition of generalized and objective measures of 
performance. Ethos here is abstracted away from the person of the practitioner. Authority 
resides instead in numbers and norms. The respect accorded to independent central banks 
and credit rating agencies furnishes the central case perhaps, though bodies like the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence, are accorded similar functions, if not quite the same 
degree of respect. This refusal of dialogue – ‘there is no alternative’ - represents the triumph 
of anti-rhetoric, the kind of scientistic pretension which Watt diagnoses in law and elsewhere. 
Third, ensuing populist challenges to technocratic dominance. These are manifest in the result 
of Britain’s Brexit referendum, the election of Donald Trump as US President and the 
mainstreaming of xenophobia in much of Europe. Associated phenomena include a lack of 
concern with fake news and the echo chambers of social media. Pathos is the dominant mode 
of proof here. Sentiments of suspicion, outrage and apprehension are called forth in order to 
dispute the neutrality of experts and raise concerns about the arrival of non-natives. If the 
challenge to Bolam marks the first of these in the field of health care, reference to the NHS 
as an index of government failure to exclude migrants marks the second. 
Where does the rhetorical future lie then? Is there a fourth way? Kayman and Watt suggest 
that I have privileged logos in my own rhetorical strategy for the book, favouring word and 
reason over image and emotion. Indeed, I can concede this and would agree that all three 
modes of proof are always in play. Nonetheless, I think, the present conjuncture calls for a 
renewed though not, of course an exclusive, emphasis on logos. This is not a plea for reason 
as univocal rationalism or scientism, but as argument and dialogue. Logos refuses the cold 
anti-rhetoric of the technocrats. It takes tradition and the particularities of the national 
seriously. Inherited stories and shared common sense are its indispensable material. Against 
the swelling rage of the populists, it counsels sobriety and substance in our deliberations. It 
also challenges ‘project fear’: the calculated production of anxiety typical of latter-day neo-
liberalism, now on the defensive. (As well as Brexit, see the 2014 referendum on Scottish 
independence.) In every case it suggests that an open, democratic future informed, but not 
determined by our best traditions, is still possible. 
 
